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I. INTRODUCTION
My purpose today is to summarize Ed Baker's autonomy theory of free
speech as it was last articulated in an article he wrote for Constitutional
Commentary and that is forthcoming later this month.1 When using Baker's
words, I am quoting from a draft of that article.2
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, West
*
Virginia University College of Law. Thanks to Robert Bastress, Vince Blasi, Jim Weinstein, and
Jim Heiko, who have conversed with me about the contents of this Transcript. Thanks to the West
Virginia Law Review editors, especially Sarah Massey and Shereen Compton, for their valuable
assistance and to the Hodges Faculty Research Grant for its support of this project. All errors are
the Author's.
I
C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (2011). It should
be noted that this presentation was given on Oct. 10, 2011.
2
For purposes of this article, the West Virginia Law Review, with the author's permission,
has cited to the final publication.
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Baker believed that the law's legitimacy required the law to respect its
citizens' formal autonomy. Today I examine Baker's autonomy theory of free
speech by presenting Baker's answers to the following three questions. One,
what is formal autonomy? Two, why is formal autonomy constitutionally
foundational to legal legitimacy? In answering this question, Baker also
explores the question why both constitutional democracy and a broad speech
freedom encompassing non-political speech are necessary to protect formal
autonomy from majoritarian or popular encroachment. Three, does Baker's
conception of formal autonomy fit First Amendment doctrine, by providing
"relatively determinate answers to important First Amendment issues,"' and
does doctrinal fit matter? In exploring that question, Baker shows that
protecting formal autonomy best exemplifies reflective equilibrium among
competing free speech theories.
II. DECONSTRUCTING BAKER'S AUTONOMY THEORY OF FREE SPEECH

A.

FormalAutonomy

Let me start with Baker's definition of formal autonomy. Because
government requires citizens to obey its laws, free speech must receive
constitutional protection to ensure that government respects citizens'
autonomy.4 This is Baker's conception (or at least one formulation) of the
government's coercive authority over its citizens. Baker recognizes, however,
that, like most values, autonomy is a "slippery" term subject to interpretation
and manipulation. 5 Accordingly, formal autonomy must be defined, Baker
posits, in a way that is difficult to misinterpret or manipulate if it is to have any
force as a core value underlying a free speech theory.
Baker's formal conception of autonomy is "a person's authority (or
right) to make decisions about herself-her own meaningful actions and
usually her use of her resources-as long as her actions do not block others'
similar authority or rights."7 Because formal autonomy is a right, citizens can
claim this right from, in this case, the government.8 There are, however, three
limitations to this right. Formal autonomy cannot, one, interfere with another
person's equally valid formal autonomy; that is, harm is permissible only in

3

Baker, supra note 1,at 251.
4
Idat 253-54.
5
Id at 251.
6
Id at 254.
7
Id; see also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The
Central Meaning ofthe First Amendment, 21 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 215 (2004).
8

Id.
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cases where the harm does not interfere with another's formal autonomy. 9 Two,
formal autonomy cannot violate certain moral constraints on majority rule.' 0
For example, slavery is morally wrong even when adopted through a
democratic vote embodying formal autonomy. And three, formal autonomy
cannot undermine the integrity of another's "decision-making authority."" For
example, free speech does not protect "violent, coercive or manipulative

actions." 1 2
In positing his conception of formal autonomy, Baker rejects the three
main alternatives: (1) "doing whatever [you] choose[];"l 3 (2) "a laissez faire
economic order;" 1 4 and (3) substantive autonomy or the "capacity to pursue
successfully the life [you] endorse[]." 5 As an initial matter, Baker rejects the
"doing whatever [you] choose[]" conception of autonomy as "an intellectually
lazy way to avoid thinking through the legal implications of a state
commitment to respect autonomy, mak[ing] the term virtually meaningless.""
Baker then moves on to the two extreme views of autonomy-autonomy as
laissez fair economic and autonomy as substantive autonomy. Baker rejects the
laissez faire economics conception of autonomy as ideologically expedient to
right-wing libertarians, but otherwise "intellectually indefensible."' 7 Finally,
Baker rejects substantive autonomy as incomplete because it cannot absolutely
protect certain kinds of speech but rather-depending on the presence and
distribution of "material resources, psychological resources, and other natural
and social conditions"-increases one person's autonomy at the expense of
another's.' 8 Although Baker acknowledges that such trade-offs are unavoidable
in politics, he believes that the pursuit of substantive autonomy "should only
use means that respect a more formal conception of autonomy of each
person."' 9

9

Baker, supra note 1, at 254-55.

10

Id. at 255.

"

Id. at 255-56.

12

Id. at 256.

'3

Id. at 252.
Id
Id at 253.
Id at 252.

14
15
16

'7
Id. at 252, 272-74; see also C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976) (arguing that First Amendment theory requires
complete denial of protection for commercial speech); see infra Part III.C.
18
Baker, supra note 1, at 253.
'9

Id. at 254.
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The Basis of a ConstitutionalTheory ofFree Speech: Establishing
Legal Legitimacy

B.

I now turn your attention to why, in Baker's view, formal autonomy is
constitutionally foundational to legal legitimacy. A constitutional theory of free
speech requires (1) "a theory of constitutional interpretation" and (2)
"specific . . . speech protections." 20 Baker correctly observes that the "great
value(s) of speech cannot [themselves] explain or identify [speech's]
constitutional status.... An explanation is needed to explain why-and
which-speech to treat differently." 2 1 To do that, Baker needs a theory of
interpretation, which I will now summarize for you.
1.

Interpretation

Baker's argument begins with Professor H.L.A. Hart, who persuasively
claimed that for law to be legitimate it must be acceptable.22 The "rule of
recognition" is the most important factor in determining the validity of the legal
23
24
system.23 Baker next identifies American rules of recognition. In his view,
they are the text of the Constitution and judicial interpretation of the text.25
Baker observes that constitutional text (absent the amendment process) is
unchanging, but interpretations can change.26 Notwithstanding this
characteristic difference between text and interpretation, constitutional text and
the Supreme Court of the United States' decisional law have equal status. 2 7
Text and interpretation are equal parts to our "rule of recognition."
Constitutional interpretation and judicial practice are two parts of the same
conversation. 28 Neither is superior to the other. 2 9 Baker also believed that the
Constitution should be understood as establishing a legitimate and functional
government.3 0 Legitimacy is crucial to Baker's theory.3'
Therefore, judicial interpretation of the Constitution should support
that understanding of the Constitution-that it must be understood as
20

Id. at 259.

21

Id

22

Id. at 261. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
Baker, supra note 1, at 260-62.

23
24

Id at 260.

25

Id.
Id

26
27
28
29

Id
Id
Id

30

Id. (citing C. EDWIN BAKER,

31

Id.

HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 272-83 (1989)).
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establishing a legitimate and functional government. 32 As Baker explains,
"those who .. . exercise power under the constitution [Members of Congress,
the President, and Supreme Court Justices] have an obligation toward
dissenters-those whom they ask to obey-to show why the
legal/constitutional order is one that the dissenters should or at least reasonably
could accept." 3 3 This is the key to legitimacy-explaining to dissenters why
they should accept the legal and constitutional order. 3 4 It should be noted,
however, that Baker's observations about how interpretation works do not
explain interpretative change-when and why particular doctrines are properly
rejected.
2.

Legitimacy

This brings us to Baker's main point-legitimacy. Baker once again
starts with Hart's point-that law is about acceptance and empowerment. 35
Baker, in agreement with Hart, claims that law's legitimacy depends less on
coercion and more on acceptance. 3 6 Baker then asks-what is reuired for a
3
legal order to be legitimate and therefore to create real obligations?
Baker examines a "thin" version of democracy, a purely procedural
form of democracy, and a stronger version of democracy, ultimately rejecting
the thin or procedural version for the stronger version. 3 8
I begin with a description of a thin version of democracy and Baker's
critique of it. A thin version of democracy contains authoritative "behavioral
norms" that are enforced as described by law:
There will always be dissent to the favored norms. All
specifications of legal rules inevitably produce losers, those
who claim other rules would be better. A democratic process,
however, in one sense "equally" respects people as properly
having a "say" in the rules they live under. (Though "equally"
only in a formal sense of "voice"-in another way, democracy
gives those in the majority more than it gives losers whose
objections potentially have no effect on resulting norms.) . ...

3

Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 262.

36

Id.

3

Id.

3

Id. at 262-65.

32
33

34
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The pay-off for the First Amendment is the possibility that a
theory of democracy can ground a theory of free speech.39
Baker offers the following three-part critique of the thin version of democracy.
First, the answer "democracy" does not really tell us much other than "one
person, one vote" and majority rule. 4 0 Accordingly, "the proper conception of
democracy needs specification."A Second, "[t]he specification cannot be
merely sociological or historical but must rely on moral or ethical
considerations." Third, we need to explain "[b]oth the status and source of
these moral considerations."4 3
Baker next examines a purely procedural version of democracy. Baker
asks why we should not build a democracy on purely procedural grounds,
which "gives majority rule a more expansive authority to restrict at least nonpolitical speech."" Additionally, "[a] procedural theory that asserts that
democracy implies authority to decide any question by 'majoritarian
processes' . . . is overtly question begging. Why accept a mere procedural

theory? And how does one determine and why should one accept specific
majoritarian processes?" 45 Baker explains:
Even if a procedural conception were favored, logically it
requires freedom (of speech) only to propose an issue for
democratic vote. After certain proposals are made, for
example, after a proposal to eliminate an existing ban of
talking about a particular issue, procedure rules could require
an immediate "call of the question." This procedural view
presumably allows majoritarian decisions to prohibit or
regulate any speech, including public discourse-except for
guaranteeing the right of legislators to propose and then vote,
maybe immediately, on proposals to repeal an existing
restriction. 46
Consequently, Baker advocates his own stronger version of democracy
that does not always yield to majority will. 47 Baker explains: "[C]onstitutional
democracy could make the legitimacy of majority decision-making depend on

3
40
41
42

Id at 263.
See id. at 263-64.
Id. at 263.
Id

43

Id

4

46

Id at 264.
Id
Id

47

Id at 263.

45

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/7

6

Lofaso: Baker's Autonomy Theory of Free Speech

2012]1

BAKER'S AUTONOMY THEORY OFFREE SPEECH

21

the process not making any decisions violating particular substantive rightsrights which might include some form of voice within the process or which
might include legal respect for individuals' general authority to make
autonomous speech choices.'48 As Baker points out, "[m]any believe that
something like the second conception of democracy[-where substantive due
process places some limit on pure majority rule-]is accepted in the United
States and many other constitutional democracies.'A 9 In summary, Baker does
not assume that a constitutional democracy must always yield to majority
will.50 In Baker's view, a constitutional democracy can place constraints on
majority will, such as substantive due process, and remain legitimate.
III. DOCTRINAL FIT AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

Baker acknowledges that our First Amendment doctrine is "robust"
although "uneven." 52 As he explains, "[t]he crucible of litigation, social
movements, and scholarly debate have left us with a robust, though somewhat
uneven, First Amendment doctrine that. . . overall is best justified by [Baker's
own] autonomy theory."5 3
Baker has some reservations about adhering too strictly to doctrinal fit.
Baker laments:
[A]cademic thought sinks to its lowest depths when its
methodological ambition is to be an apologist for the status
quo. The measure of the appeal of a First Amendment theory
should not be the extent that it conforms to existing doctrine
but the quality of its explanation of those aspects of existing
doctrine that should be approved and, while linking
meaningfully to existing constitutional discourse, the
persuasiveness of its critique of aspects of doctrine that should
be rejected. Though some scholars see their task to explain the
at least legal correctness of [cases such as] Dred Scott, Plessy,
or Lochner, or more relevant to us, Dennis, at least at the time
they were decided, with their task and theory requiring change
as doctrine twists and turns, [Baker's] hope is that [he] would
have been one who, at the time of these decisions, would offer

48

Id

49

Id at 263-64.
Id. at 268-69.
See id.
Id. at 270.
Id.

50

s1
52

53

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

22

[Vol. 115

a legal critique, as the dissenters on the Court attempted, in
addition to a political critique.54
With these reservations in mind, let's consider doctrinal areas, which in
Baker's opinion, best justify or are best critiqued by autonomy theory.
A.

Flag Salute-West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

The Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette ss
endorsed the view that a school child has a liberty right to abstain from saluting
the flag.56 As Baker points out, the Court relied on the speakers' right to
express themselves-a Bakerian formal autonomy construct, not on the
listeners' right, which forms a basis of the marketplace of ideas theory and
democratic discourse theory. 57 The right to express oneself is by definition an
aspect of one's formal autonomy-it allows the speaker to decide for herself
whether she wishes to salute the flag, free from the coercive power of the state.
Barnettethen justly takes its place as the "poster child of autonomy theory."5 s
B.

Art and Music

I think that Baker is correct in noting that liberty is the best explanation
for protecting art and music as free expression. 59 Baker cogently states that it is
"the liberty of the creators or performers and their audiences . . . [that is] at

stake ... [and that] should be legally respected." 60 Once again, for Baker, art
and music are expressive forms that allow the "speaker" to express her own
thoughts and emotions. Relying on reflective equilibrium, Baker points out that
abstract art and compositional music require a stretch to justify as political
speech or truth propositions necessary to test the free market of ideas. 6 1 Baker
further points out that, while some art might further public discourse, as Robert
Post suggests as the basis for First Amendment theory, "this is seldom the aim
of the communication and this ground for protection surely feels far from the
heart of why most people engage in these forms of expression."62

54
Id (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (holding that legislation
preventing the formation of a Communist Party did not violate the First Amendment)).
ss
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56
Id. at 642; Baker, supra note 1, at 270-71.

5

Baker, supra note 1, at 270.

5

Id.
Id. at 272.
Id.

59
60
61

62

Id at 271-72.
Id at 272.
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Commercial Speech 63

C.

Baker views commercial speech as "a clear battle ground for free
speech theories."6 Baker acknowledges that the ideas and information in
commercial advertisements can make some contribution to the market place of
ideas and also to a person's substantive autonomy. 65 Accordingly,
constitutional protection operates effectively in a market place of ideas theory
of free speech.6 6 Moreover, if the democratic discourse theory focuses on
information that is relevant to or can affect self-government, Baker
acknowledges that protection also follows; this seems to fit into the case law.67
Baker notes, however, that "[i]f . .. democratic discourse focuses on citizens'
participation in the public sphere or her aim to contribute to public opinion,
denial of constitutional protection would follow." 68 Here is where Baker uses
reflective equilibrium to depart from doctrinal fit: "Democratic legitimacy
involves empowering citizen governors, not commercial entities." 69 But "[t]his
second democratic argument ... is essentially a restricted autonomy-based
theory-one limited to the political sphere." 70
Baker provides three reasons why the First Amendment does not
protect commercial speech. First, neither liberty nor autonomy is at stake to the
extent that the free market compels market participants to seek profit
maximization, for "money, not communicative action, provides the steering
mechanism."71 Second, businesses are "legally constructed, instrumentally
valued, artificial entit[ies]."7 2 Accordingly, "the moral/constitutional autonomybased justification for protecting speech of flesh and blood people is simply not
at stake here."73 Third, "market exchanges use property as power . .. to get the
other party to do something that she otherwise would not want to do-give the

For a more in-depth argument regarding commercial speech, see C. Edwin Baker, The First
Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 981-85 (2009).
6
Baker, supra note 1, at 272 (citing Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the
Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
429, 432 (1971)).
63

65

Id.

66

Id. (citing Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 432 (1971)).
67
68

Id.

69

I1d.

70

Id

71

Id.

72

Id. at 273.

7

Id.

Id.
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speaker her money, property, or service." 74 Here, Baker is pointing out what the
dissent in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti75 advanced-the nature of
the coercive effect of private sources of power:
[W]hat some have considered to be the principal function of
the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of
self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at
all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the
communications of profitmaking corporations. . . do not
represent a manifestation of individual freedom or choice.7 6
While, as Baker points out, this point was subsequently adopted by Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,n it was overruled by Citizens United v.
FederalElection Commission,7 8 about six weeks after Baker's death.
D.

Press

Baker notes that the "arguments to deny protection to the speech of
commercial entities immediately put into question the status of the press, which
today is largely constituted by large market-oriented entities." 7 9 Baker had
previously observed that press clause jurisprudence is "incoherent without the
assumption that the press clause has an independent meaning."so For example,
this independence explains giving media corporations different speech rights
than other corporations.8 1 The press's role in democratic discourse justifies the
separate constitutional significance of the press and the differences between its
treatment and the treatment of either individuals or other corporations.82 The
press's different and instrumental role in democratic discourse does not justify
less or more affirmative speech rights for media than for individuals, but it does
justify some forms of special protection.

74

Id.

75

435 U.S. 765, 803-28 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
Baker, supra note 1, at 274 (quoting First Nat'lBank ofBoston, 435 U.S. at 804-05).

76

Id (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (holding that
n
corporate speech may be banned in certain circumstances)).
78

558 U.S. 50 (2010).

Baker, supra note 1, at 274.
Id at 275 (citing C. EDwIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 193-213 (2002);
C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35
HOFSTRA L. REv. 955 (2007); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-BasedRegulation
ofPersonsand Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 57 (1994)).
81
Id.
7

so

82

Id

83

Id.
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Obscenity

Existing doctrine denies protection to obscenity.84 Baker views this as a
theoretical battleground because obscene material is so widely available due to
the Internet and even in urban newsstands. Baker puts aside the issue of child
pornography.86 Baker points out, for example, that Justice Brennan's
marketplace of ideas approach in Roth v. United States87 would likely deny
protection to obscenity because of the lack of any role it would play in the
search for the truth. Political speech theories would deny protection because
of obscenity's lack of political effects.89 Liberty theory, however, protects
obscenity because of the objectionable nature of regulating speech involving
"willing adult[s]" and "the right to exercise 'autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, tastes, and personality."' 90
F.

Speech and Government Secrecy

Baker asks us to think about how we can distinguish in principle the
government keeping specified information secret and prohibiting
communication of that specified information to keep it unknown.9' Many
versions of the marketplace of ideas and substantive autonomy, both of which
focus on the listeners' substantive autonomy, would have trouble distinguishing
these two situations.92 Baker's liberty theory and his press theory can easily
make this distinction. This distinction follows easily from the speakers' or the
press's formal freedom to say whatever they choose, given the knowledge or
the imagination. Baker's point: the government may very well have
compelling reasons to keep information secret, but it can pursue these ends
only by means that do not violate people's autonomy or the press's freedom in
respect to speech.94 Once again, unlike other forms of free speech theory,
Baker's liberty theory values the rights of citizen's over the coercive power of
the government.

84

Id. at 276.

85
86

Id.
Id at 277.

8

354 U.S. 476 (1957).

Baker, supra note 1, at 276.
Id at 277.
90
Id. at 276 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 85 n.9 (1973) (Brennan J.,
dissenting) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973))).
88

8

91

Id. at 277.

92

Id
Id at 278.

93
94

Id
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Content Discrimination

G.

In Baker's view, "[h]ornbook doctrine.. . confus[es] ... and routinely
overstates the force of the doctrinal bar on content discrimination (and if, as
[Baker] believe[d], Justice Kennedy is right, [hornbook doctrine] understates its
proper force where it is applicable)." 95 Baker cites as his prime example the
problem of content discrimination for those who value political speech over
non-political speech.96
Baker claims that the Supreme Court's analysis in Chicago Police
Department v. Mosley97 demonstrates the superiority of his autonomy theory in
fitting doctrine.98 According to the Court,
Although preventing school disruption is a city's legitimate
concern, Chicago itself has determined that peaceful labor
picketing during school hours is not an undue interference with
school. Therefore ... Chicago may not maintain that other
picketing disrupts the school unless that picketing is clearly
99
more disruptive than the picketing Chicago already permits.
In other words, content discrimination must be justified. Baker writes in
response:
From the perspective of valuing autonomy, although
government clearly must be permitted to use public property to
advance public projects and, thus, to impose time and place
limits on speech that constitute actual interferences with these
projects, respect for individual expressive autonomy means
that the expression must be allowed on public property when it
does not constitute such an interference. oo
For Baker then, the content discrimination rule is merely "ground for finding
that this respect for autonomy is absent." 0 1 Unlike those who ground free
speech theory in the political/non-political distinction, Baker's theory
condemns content discrimination absent such a justification.

9

Id.

96

Id.

9

408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Baker, supra note 1, at 278.

98
9
100
101

Chi. Police Dep't, 408 U.S. at 100.
Baker, supra note 1, at 280.
Id
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Public Employee Speech

Baker's theory would once again generate a more protective
02
conception of public employee speech than would current case law.1 This is
where Ed's autonomy theory of free speech and my labor theory promoting the
autonomous dignified worker cross paths.10 3 I leave that discussion open for
another article.
IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout his life, a life cut off in its prime, Baker developed a
robust, coherent, and appealing free speech theory. That theory, grounded in
the value of formal autonomy, accomplished more than mere doctrinal fit. To
be sure, Baker's autonomy did in fact explain a good deal of current First
Amendment jurisprudence. Baker's autonomy theory also cogently revealed
places where our otherwise robust constitutional free speech jurisprudence was
vulnerable. By capturing the essence of free speech value-to protect a
person's right to make decisions about herself so long as her actions do not
frustrate others' similar rights-Baker is able to put forth an appealing vision of
the Free Speech Clause toward which our posterity can strive. In his life, Baker
sought always to write about the kind of society he wished to live in-a society
that enhanced and maximized self-authorship. His final words on free speech
accomplish just that-a society in which we might all enjoy living and
prospering.

102
See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that discharge of former
attorney for questioning her supervisors and opposing being transferred to another office did not
violate attorney's constitutionally protected right of free speech).
103
Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a FoundationalTheory of Workers' Rights: The Autonomous
Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2007).
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